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CRIMINAL

RECENT DECISIONS

LAW-PROSECUTION

OF

MORMON

UNDER THE MANN ACT-DOCTRINE OF CAMINETTI

"FUNDAMENTALISTS''

v.

UNITED STATES--

Petitioners, Mormon "Fundamentalists," 1 transported one or more plural
wives in interstate commerce. They were convicted in the district court 2 on the
authority of Cmninetti v. United States 8 for violation of the Mann Act which
prohibits the transportation of women or girls in commerce "for the purpose of
prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." 4 The circuit

1 For a description of the Mormon teaching and practice of plural marriages, see
"Pleas for Religious Liberty and the Rights of Conscience," the arguments delivered
by counsel for the plaintiff in error, April 28, 1886, in Snow v. United States, II8
U.S. 346, 6 S. Ct. 1059 (1886).
2 (D.C. Utah 1944) 56 F. Supp. 890.
8 242 U.S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192 (1917).
'The White Slave Traffic Act, 36 Stat. L. 825, c. 395, § 2 (1910), 18 U.S.C.
(1940) § 397-404.
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. court G affirmed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held,
affirmed. The phrase "or for any other immoral purpose" was properly interpreted in Caminetti v. United States to extend the prohibition of the act to cases
where the ·transportation was voluntary and lacked the element of commercialized vice. 6 Cleveland v. United States, (U.S. 1946) 67 S. Ct. 13.
In Caminetti v. United States, the Supreme Court decided that the defendant had violated the White Slave Traffic Act, more familiarly known as the
Mann Act, in transporting a woman in interstate commerce to become his
mistress. The Court felt that the facts were covered by the words "or for any
other immoral purpose," a phrase which had been held to include concubinage
in United States v. Bitty,1 a prosecution under the immigration laws decided a
few years earlier.8 Counsei in the Caminetti case argued that the interpretation
given the phrase in United States v. Bitty might have been justified because it
had appeared as an amendment broadening an earlier provision of the law but
that the legislative history of the -Mann Act indicated that Congress intended
only to reach the problem of commercialized vice. 9 This was the position taken
by a strongly worded dissent in that case.10 But the Court, speaking through
Justice Day, relied on the reasoning of the Bitty case to decide that since Congress had employed the word "prostitution," it would be impossible to limit the
application of the act to commercialized vice and give any effect to the phrase
"or for any other immoral purpose." 11 If the Court in the principal case had
been unwijling to extend the rule of the Caminetti case to the slightly different
facts of plural marriages purportedly sanctioned by petitioners' religion, it could
hav~ limited that decision to its exact facts, ,or overruled it as a misinterpretation
,of Congressional intent in the Mann Act. The authority of Congress to forbid
the use of interstate commerce to effect immoral purposes of any description is
taken for granted,12 and the Supreme Court has consistently denied that a violation of a law embodying a principle of common morality can be excused by
pleading the religious convictions of the offender.18 It is further evident that the
Caminetti decision is sound statutory interpretation in so far as restricting the
(C.C.A. 10th, 1945) 146 F. (2d) 730.
The opinion of the Court, was delivered by Justice Douglas. Justice Rutledge
concurred on the theory that the case was governed by Caminetti v. United States so
long as that decision was not overruled. Justices Black and Jackson woufd have reversed by limiting the Caminetti decision to its facts. Justice Murphy dissented in
the belief that the Court should have overruled Caminetti v. United States.
7
208 U.S. 393, 8 S. Ct. 396 (1908).
8 34 Stat. L. 898 at 899, § 3, c. II 34 ( l 907). The act forbade the importation
into the United States "of any alien woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution, or
for any other immoral purpose."
9
See 242 U.S. 470 at 476 ff., 37 S. Ct. 192 (1917).
10
Id. at 496 ff. Justice McKenna with whom Chief Justice White and Justice
Clarke concurred.
·
11
Id. at 487.
12
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281 (1913).
18
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333, IO S. Ct. 299 (1890); Romney v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, IO S. Ct. 792
( 1890). The cited cases all arose out of legislation designed to suppress the Mormon
practice of plural marriages.
G
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operation of the act to commercialized vice would be to ignore the language "or
for any other immoral.purpose." There is, however, authority for refu~ing to
apply a statute to a state of facts which comes within its terms put which the
legislature clearly never intended to affect.14 In State v. Day 15 the Maine
court concluded that a state statute punishing the intra-state transportation of
"any female person for the purpose of prostitution or for ailj" other immoral
purpose" 15 did not apply to a case of simple fornication. The court did not believe the legislature intended to penalized as a felony what previously had been
treated as a misdemeanor simply because the offense was preceded by transportation. In interpretating the Mann Act, however, the Supreme Court has not
had so direct a means of assuring itself of the Congressional intent. Apart from
the question of the Caminetti case, it may be that to have reached the opposite
result in the principal case would have been inconsistent with another -decision
of long established authority. In Athanasaw v. United States u the Supreme
Court held that the defendant had violated the Mann Act when he transported
a girl in interstate commerce to appear in a chorus, though it was not established
that he intended her prostitution or her immoral use by himself or others.
The Court approved a jury instruction of the lower court that the defendant
was guilty if he had brought the girl into an environment which would "induce
her to give herself up to a condition of debauchery which eventually and naturally would lead to a course of immorality sexually." 18 This decision has been
followed in a long line of cases. 19 It was used in Beyer v. United States 20 as
authority to convict defendants who had hired girls as night club employees by
written contracts which forbade their engaging in prostitution. It sufficed that
defendants had "placed the girls in an environment in which they were likely
to be solicited to engage in prostitution . . . ." 21 It is difficult to see how petitioners in the principal case, who had conducted women in interstate commerce
for their own immoral purposes,1 2 could have been acquitted so long as it is an
offense under the Mann Ac~ merely to transport a woman into circumstances
where her immoral conduct is likely to result.
·
John A. Huston, S.Ed.
u In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 51 I
(1892), the Supreme Court held that an act of Congress which made it unlawful to
import any alien " •.. to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States .••"
should not be construed to apply to the plaintiff in error's employment of an English
rector.
15
132 Me. 38, 165 A. 163 (1933).
16
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 135, § 22.
17
227 U.S. 326, 33 S. Ct. 285 (1913).
1s 1d. at 332.
19
United States v. Lewis, (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) uo F. (~d) 460; Pine v. United
States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 353.
20
(C.C.A. 9th, 1918) 251 F. 39.
21
Id. at 41.
22 Part of Justice Murphy's dissent discusses polygamy as a form of marriage and
distinguishes it from vulgar immorality. It is at least questionable whether conclusions
about polygamy drawn from a consideration of societies where it is a prevailing institution were relevant in the principal case. The facts of each offense are sketched in the
opinion of the district court (note 2, supra)-. Three of the petitioners, for example,
had contrived the marriage of one of their number with a minor ~irl of retarded mentality.

